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INTRODUCTION
In organizing a symposium on norms and corporate law, one
makes an implicit claim that the concept of norms is significant to our
understanding of corporate law and the problems corporate law is
meant to address. Unsurprisingly, the main organizers of this Sym-
posium, Professors Rock and Wachter, advance the thesis that firms
t Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I would like to thank
Jennifer Mien, Lucian Bebchuk, Henry Hansmann, Ehud Kamar, Mike Klausner, Jody
Kraus, Paul Mahoney, Ed Rock, and the participants in the Symposium on Norms and
Corporate Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School for comments and the
Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund for financial assistance.
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are largely governed by norms, and not by law.'
I am more skeptical about the relevance of norms to corporate
law. Partly, my skepticism is related to the very concept of norms as
used in the "law and norms" literature. Most contributors to that
literature have their own (often itself ambiguous) definition of
"norms," and many bemoan the fact that no agreed-upon definition of
the term exists.2  For example, Robert Ellickson, one of the norms
pioneers, defines norms as rules that emanate from social forces,
distinguishing them from personal ethics (internalized rules),
contracts (rules imposed by second-party controllers), rules imposed
by organizations, and laws (rules imposed by governments).' Eric
Posner, in a contribution to an earlier symposium on norms, defines
norms as rules that distinguish "desirable and undesirable behavior"
and give "a third party the authority to punish a person who engages
in the undesirable behavior."4 Richard McAdams notes that norms
refer to "informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to
follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of
external nonlegal sanctions, or both."5 For Bob Cooter, by contrast,
I Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms,
and the Self-Governing Corporation 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001); see also Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1738 (2001) (arguing that "internalized trust and
trustworthiness play important roles in discouraging opportunistic behavior among
corporate participants" (emphasis omitted)); Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg,
Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1717 (2001)
(advancing the thesis that "firm-specific fairness norms typically promote efficiency"
and that "firm-specific fairness norms best promote efficiency when supported by
reputation effects and when the firm's agents internalize the norms"); Saul Levmore,
Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1936-39 (2001)
(arguing that norms regarding nonconflicting fortunes partially explain the
prevalence of nonindexed options); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1820-23 (2001) (arguing that norms-related shaming sanctions are
important in the corporate context).
See, e.g., David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual
Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1845 (1996) ("[Olne might question whether it
is useful to use the same term ('norms') for comprehensive and relatively complex
regimes as for more informal and diffuse sanctioning systems."); Richard H. McAdams,
The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MIcH. L. REv. 338, 342 (1997)
(noting "fundamental ambiguities in the term norm" that give the law and norms
literature "an unnecessarily ad hoc appearance" (emphasis omitted)); Eric A. Posner,
Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996) ("The
concept of a 'norm' is slippery, and scholars use it in different ways.").
3 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrIHOuT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DIsPUTES 125-27 (1991).
4 Posner, supra note 2, at 1699.
5 McAdams, supra note 2, at 340.
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internalization by a large group of people is a necessary prerequisite
for a norm.6 Richard Posner and Eric Rasmusen regard as norms any
social rule "that does not depend on government for either
promulgation or enforcement."7 Striking a similar vein, Ed Rock and
Mike Wachter, in their invitation for and contribution to this
Symposium, explain that norms mean "nonlegally enforceable rules
and standards."s For Mel Eisenberg, norms include any behavioral
patterns, regardless of whether they entail a sense of obligation and
regardless of whether they are self-consciously adhered to.9
Since there appears to be no norm for the definition of "norms,"
the "norms" terminology does not add much conceptual clarity.
Possibly, "law and normers" would be better off byjettisoning the term
"norm" and instead using a set of different terms.'0 (The persistence
of the "norms" terminology despite its conceptual ambiguity, however,
suggests that "law and normers" obtain reputational or psychic
benefits from participating in a "law and norms" movement.) In this
respect, Rock and Wachter deserve applause for using the precise (if
inelegant) acronym of NLERS to denote their concept of norms."
My skepticism about the relevance of norms to corporate law,
however, extends beyond the conceptual ambiguity of the term. Even
well-defined renditions of the norms concept suffer from one of two
shortcomings. In their wider definitions, "norms" include phenom-
ena that are so heterogeneous that the term "norms" does not add a
useful conceptual tool to their analysis. In particular, many of these
wider definitions encompass socially created or enforced incentives as
well as market-created structures that have long been analyzed in the
traditional economics literature. In the narrower definitions, by
contrast, norms tend to be only of limited significance for corporate
governance.
" See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the Law Merchan 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1661-66 (1996)
(noting that a social norm exists if enough people have internalized a sense of
obligation and the resulting threat of criticism and punishment deters violation by
others).
7 Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special
Rference to Sanctions, 19 IN'"L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369 (1999).
Rock & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1623.
Mehin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253,
1256-57 (1999).
jo Here are a few suggestions, some of which are already employed to denote
specific subcategories of norms: tastes, ethics, habits, practices, ideologies, belief
s)s tems, social obligations, and NLERS (nonlegally enforceable rules and standards).
1 Rock & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1641.
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Let me qualify my latter argument by stressing that it is context-
specific. It is confined to the significance of norms in the "internal
affairs" of a public corporation-that is, to the relationship between
shareholders and managers-in the present-day United States.
"Norms" may well be important in other contexts, such as property
disputes in Shasta County,' 2 labor relations,' 3 safe sex education,' 4 or
economic transitions, '5 to corporate law in other countries," or even
to relations within closely held companies in the United States. But
for an understanding of the internal affairs of present-day, U.S. public
companies, norms have only a limited significance.
In Part I of this Article, I present a working definition of norms
and sketch the role of law in the corporate structure. My definition of
norms encompasses rules, other than legal duties, that are regularly
followed due to either an external "punitive" sanction administered by
a third party or a related internalized sense of obligation. Corporate
law regulates the internal affairs of a corporation primarily by
establishing a system of powers and only to a lesser extent by creating
a system of duties. Necessarily, therefore, nonlegal factors (including,
possibly, norms) affect how these powers are exercised.
Part II presents a framework for analyzing the role of norms in
corporate governance. The principal structural aim of corporate law
is the effective regulation of centralized management. Since
centralized management is easily established-by giving a board of
directors broad powers to act-the main focus of corporate
governance is to establish an incentive structure bearing on corporate
managers that assures that managers act in the interest of
shareholders. In Part H, I identify six categories of this incentive
scheme. The first three categories of incentives-compensation-
related, job-preservation-related, and liability-regime-related--derive
12 See ELLICKSON, supra note 3.
13 See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the
Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913 (1996).
See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943,
1019-25 (1995) (examining the regulation of dangerous sex in the context of "social
meaning regulation").
is See Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2055, 2062-63 (1996) (noting the relationship between background social norms
and successful economic systems).
16 See, e.g., Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon
Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69, 104-16 (1998) (suggesting
that cultural factors account for the German governance model); id. at 121-22
(mentioning the common claim that German business ethics are incompatible with
hostile takeovers).
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from the powers and rights established by corporate law. The latter
three categories of incentives-future-employment-related, social-
status-related, and internalized-are external to corporate law.
Norms potentially affect incentives in four of these categories:
compensation, job preservation, social status, and internalized
incentives.
Part III considers the significance of norms for compensation and
job-preservation-related incentives. With respect to executive
compensation, I conclude that although its structure is principally
driven by economic and regulatory factors, norms may have a limited
influence. With respect to director replacement, however, norms play
no material role.
Part 1V examines the relation between norms and social-status-
related and internalized incentives. Although norms may well be
significant to social-status-related incentives, these incentives do not
have a substantial impact on managerial agency costs. With respect to
internalized incentives, I suggest that the key factor is the economic
process of managerial selection, which results in the promotion of
managers who have internalized beneficial norms, rather than the
existence of norms that are specifically managerial.
I. NoRMs AND LAW
A. Norms
The plethora of definitions of "norms" is troubling in several
respects. To begin with, it is obviously difficult to discuss a concept if
that concept has no well-defined content. Moreover, the definitions
of "norms" exhibit an imperialistic trend, having expanded over time
from a relatively narrow set to include virtually everything other than
law. Evidencing this expansion, for example, Mel Eisenberg has
recently defined social norms to encompass "all rules and regularities
concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and organizational
rules.'
7
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the definitions of
"norms," however, is that the wider definitions include under the
norms umbrella dissimilar incentive structures, some of which are
well-defined and analyzed outside the "law and norms" literature.
Under many of these wider definitions, any type of rule ("you
17 Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1255 (emphasis added).
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shall. .." or "you shall not. ..") governing how to conduct oneself,
which is regularly followed by at least a relevant subset of actors and
which is not a command of law, is a norm. This set, however, includes
rules that are followed because they are internalized and rules that are
followed because of external (nonlegal) sanctions (with sanctions
referring to both a negative sanction-punishment-and a positive
one-reward). It includes rules that are enforced by second-party
sanctions (that is, sanctions administered by the party who suffers
from the rules violation) and rules that are enforced by third-party
sanctions (that is, sanctions administered by a person other than the
party who suffers from the rules violation). And it includes rules in
which enforcement is motivated by self-protection and rules in which
enforcement is intended to punish the rule-violator (or reward the
rule-abider).
For example, a small-town grocery store may not sell low-quality
produce because the owner takes pride in the quality of the food she
sells (internalized rule) or because her customers would buy fewer
goods (external sanction). In the latter case, the owner may fear that
customers who bought low-quality produce will take their business to
another store (second-party enforced) or tell their friends, who will
then take their business to another store (third-party enforced).
Customers who take their business to a different store may do so
because they want to avoid buying low-quality produce in the future
(self-protective enforcement) or out of resentment for how their
friends were treated when they last bought produce at that store
(punitive enforcement).
I regard these distinctions as important because second-party and
third-party self-protective enforcement are primarily economic in
character.' Such enforcement can be, and long has been, analyzed
using traditional economic tools and neither requires nor benefits
from being lumped under the heading of "norms."9
is Even punitive second-party enforcement can be part of an economically
motivated reputational strategy.
Iq For economic analysis of the concept of reputation, which is related to self-
protective enforcement, see, for example, Pierpaolo Battigalli & Joel Watson, On
"Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs, 65 ECONOMETRICA 369 (1997); Marco
Celentani et al., Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent, 64
ECONOMETRICA 691 (1996); Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces
in Assuring Contractual Perfrmance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); David M. Kreps &
Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982);
Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entiy Deterrence, 27 J. ECON.
THEORY 280 (1982); Carl Shapiro, Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller
Reputation, 13 BELLJ. ECON. 20 (1982); Carl Shapiro, Premiumsfor High Quality Products
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For purposes of this Article, I therefore define "norms" to include
only rules of conduct, other than legal commands, that are regularly
followed and that are sanctioned by punitive third-party enforcement,
as well as internalized rules that correspond to such third-party-
enforced rules. This definition includes most incentive structures that
are not economic or legal in character. And even though it lumps
together two distinct enforcement mechanisms, internalized rules and
punitive third-party-enforced rules with the same content are arguably
mutually reinforcing to such a high degree that separating these
mechanisms would not be useful.
B. Law
As norms exclude legal commands, it is helpful next to examine
the rules of corporate law. To lend some greater precision to this
endeavor, I will employ Hohfeldian terminology.0 Hohfeld distin-
guishes among four basic types of legal entitlements (with four
correlative encumbrances): rights, privileges, powers, and immun-
ities. Rights and privileges refer to static relations. X has a right as
regards Ywrith respect to an action if Yviolates a correlative duty if she
takes the action. X has a privilege as regards Ywith respect to an action
if Xmay take the action (with Yhaving a no-right). For example, Xhas
a ight that Y not enter Xs property and a privilege to enter her own
property. Y has a duty not to enter X's property and a no-right to stop
Xfrom entering Xs property.2
Powers and immunities refer to dynamic relations. A power
connotes the ability, through one's volitional act, to change a legal
relation. If Y offers to buy X's property, for example, X obtains the
power to accept Is offer (and thereby give Y a right to have X
perform) and Y becomes subject to a corresponding liability. And
unless Xhas offered to sell her property to Y, Xhas an immunity and Y
21a correlative disability with respect to such a sale.
Hohfeld thus clarifies that law extends far beyond creating rights:
"One of the greatest hindrances to the clear understanding, the
incisive statement, and the true solution of legal problems frequently
as Puturns to Reputations, 98 Q.J. ECON. 659 (1983); Steven Tadelis, What's in a Name?:
Reputation as a TradeableAsset, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 548 (1999).
_' Set, Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
t,asouing, 23 YAE L.J. 16 (1913).
Id. at 30-44.
Id. at 44-58.
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arises from the express or tacit assumption that all legal relations may
be reduced to 'rights' and 'duties' ....,,23 To the extent that some law
and normers have made this assumption, they have understated the
24significance of law.
Turning to corporate law, the corporate form creates, in
Hohfeldian terms, the following three principal legal relations. First,
it vests in the directors powers with respect to the corporate property in
relation to third parties, such as the power to accept an offer by a
third party to purchase the property.25 Second, it vests in shareholders
the power to replace the directors, as well as some governance powers,
such as the power to change the by-laws or to approve a charter
amendment or merger proposed by the directors. 6 Third, it vests in
shareholders rights vis-A-vis the directors and imposes correlative
fiduciary and statutory duties on the directors. "
This description is, of course, highly simplified. It leaves out many
important details and important features, such as limited liability-a
Hohfeldian no-right by corporate creditors to seek payment from
shareholders-that do not relate to the internal affairs of a
28corporation. To some extent, these omissions are addressed later in
this Article. At this point, however, I would like to make two
observations.
First, the creation of powers is a crucial formal feature of the
corporate form. The corporate form establishes the powers of
directors over corporate property and the power of shareholders to
replace directors. As the Hohfeldian distinction between rights and
powers highlights, powers contain an inherent discretionary element,
the exercise of which is not governed by law.29 When law confers a
23 Id. at 28.
24 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 127 (suggesting that laws are sanction-
triggering rules enforced by the state).
25 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) ("The business and affairs of
every corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors....").
26 See, e.g., id. § 141(k) (allowing for the removal of directors); id. § 211(b)
(providing for the election of directors).27
See, e.g., id. §§ 219-220 (providing for information rights of shareholders);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (indicating that directors owe
fiduciary duties to shareholders).
28 Limited liability is, for shareholders of nonpublic companies, probably an
important benefit to incorporating. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2.1
(1986).
29 See, e.g., Hohfeld, supra note 20, at 21-25 (discussing the variant concepts of
legal interests and legal powers).
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power, law does not thereby prescribe how this power is to be
exercised.' This implies that when a power is or is not exercised, the
law that established the power and something else that determines its
use necessarily interact. One issue I will address is whether this
"something else" can be profitably categorized as norms.:"
Second, the three principal legal relations created by the
corporate form are substantively linked as they all concern the
regulation of centralized management. By obtaining powers over the
corporate property, directors have the legal ability to run the
corporation's affairs. This power can be regulated by circumscribing
its extent (through direct limits on directors' powers), by
circumscribing the manner in which it is exercised (through duties),
and by preserving shareholders' options to override specific decisions
or to divest certain directors of their power altogether (through
shareholder governance powers and their power to elect directors).
The main aim of these legal rules, and the ultimate issue in
structuring a public corporation, is to give managers the ability and
the incentives to run the company in the interests of the
shareholders.3 Another issue I will address is whether norms play a
significant role in this scheme.3
II. INCENTIVES, NoRMs, AND LAW
The effective management of a public corporation requires the
separation of ownership and control. Multiple, dispersed share-
holders cannot themselves make the many day-to-day management
decisions that it takes to run a public company. The corporate form
solves this problem by delegating the power to manage the company
to the board of directors, which further delegates the power to the
corporate officers."'
The resulting separation of ownership and control, however,
creates an agency problem: since managers do not own all of the
corporation's equity-indeed, they often own only a trivial portion-
"W This is also true for rights. The law may give you a right, but it does not tell you
whether you should enforce it or not. If one takes into account that rights are not
automatically enforced, actions that infringe on a Hohfeldian right (Y stepping on Xs
property) really confer a Hohfeldian power (Xmay elect to obtain damages from Y).
See infra Part III.
See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 1.
See infra Part III.
34 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic
Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. RE. 347, 353-54 (1991).
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their interests diverge from those of the shareholders as a group.3
The main issue in corporate governance is therefore to create
incentives for managers to run the company in the interest of
shareholders. I will refer to managers who run the company in this
fashion as "well-performing" or "high-quality" managers and exec-
utives.
The incentive structure that affects how well a manager will
perform is complex. In this Part, I first classify the incentives into six
substantive categories. The first three categories include incentives
that are internal to corporate law: incentives related to compensation,
job preservation, and the corporate liability regime. The remaining
three categories include incentives that are largely external to
corporate law: incentives related to future employment, social status,
36and internalized incentives.
35 Unlike principals in a standard agency relationship, shareholders of a
corporation cannot themselves exercise power over the property of a corporation or
give their agents binding directions on how to exercise such powers. This lack of
shareholder powers is not a necessary consequence of granting operational powers to
the board (centralized management). Even if the board has operational powers,
shareholders could retain the power to give operational directions to the directors. In
fact, the board of directors generally delegates its day-by-day operational powers to the
corporate officers, but nevertheless retains the power to give directions to the officers.
Id. at 354 (noting that the typical delegation of power is not absolute). Although there
are various theories that may justify the fact that shareholders lack the power to give
operational directions to the board, see, e.g., id. at 359-63 (suggesting that one problem
of shareholder voting is "cycling"), in my view, the lack of shareholder operational
powers is largely trivial and, to the extent it matters, probably inefficient. Even if
shareholders had the power to make operational decisions, this power would rarely be
exercised. Running a company takes information, expertise, and the ability to react
quickly to developments; it is a task for which dispersed shareholders are ill-suited.
Being rationally aware of their own limitations, shareholders will generally leave the
job of running the company's operations to the professional managers. More
important than the lack of operational powers are the limits on shareholder
governance powers. Shareholders, for example, cannot, without board approval,
change governance provisions in the certificate of incorporation, see DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (1991 & Supp. 2000) (requiring board approval for charter
amendments), or reincorporate the corporation into a different state, see id. § 251 (b)
(requiring board approval for a merger). Possessing such governance powers would
be useful for shareholders. Cf Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reconsidering the Allocation of
Power Between Managers and Shareholder (Apr. 3, 2001) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (arguing that shareholders should have the power to change the
charter or reincorporate without board approval).
36 The principal incentive structure discussed here is the one bearing on
managers who make operational decisions. Other pertinent incentive structures
include the ones bearing on outside directors and on shareholders with respect to
governance decisions that in turn affect the incentive structure bearing on managers-
for example, decisions to set the compensation scheme or to oust managers. These
latter structures are discussed in the context of managers' incentives.
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A. Compensation-Related Incentives
The compensation structure for managers can provide them with
important incentives. If well-performing managers receive greater
compensation than non-well-performing managers, incentives for
high-quality management are enhanced. On the other hand,
compensation can also create "perverse" incentives to perform less
well-for example, by rewarding managers who engage in expansions
and diversification that reduce company value. 7
Compensation-related incentives can be created through a plan
that promises greater benefits to managers who perform in a certain
manner. In the United States, such incentive compensation plans
usually take the form of bonus plans, in which managers are promised
a certain extra payment if they meet specified performance targets
(thus creating incentives to meet these targets),3 or stock option
plans, in which managers are awarded stock options or similar
financial products that increase in value as the company's stock price
increases (thus creating incentives to increase the company's stock
price).)' In addition to these plans, the possibility that well-perform-
ing managers will receive future raises in their compensation can
provide incentives for high-quality management.*
B. Job-Preservation-Related Incentives
The desire of managers to retain their jobs, or, at least, not be
forced to depart, is another important element in the incentive
structure.4' If bad performance leads to a higher probability of a
forced departure, managers will have incentives to perform well.
Corporate law provides several mechanisms by which managers
37 See, e.g., Patricia M. Dechow & Richard G. Sloan, Executive Incentives and the
Horizon Problem, 14 J. Accr. & EcoN. 51, 55 (1991) (noting that accounting-based
bonus plans may create perverse incentives to reduce research and development
expenditures).
i See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation
Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & Ep. L. 227, 234-35 (1999)
(describing bonus plans).
See infra Part III.A.2.
See Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder
Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 138-39 (2000)
(adducing e~idence that salaries are increased at well-performing firms, but not
lowered at poorly performing firms).
4 SeeJerold B. Warner & Ross L. Watts, Stock Prices and Top Management Changes, 20
J. FIN. ECON. 461 (1988) (finding an inverse relation between the probability of a
management change and a firm's share performance).
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can be ousted. Shareholders can precipitate an ouster through a
traditional proxy contest in which they elect a rival management
team.4 2 A raider can acquire the company and fire managers." Or
outside directors, prompted by shareholders or on their own initiative,
can oust the incumbent managers.44
Here, as well, it is conceivable that incentives may be perverse. If,
for example, the stock of companies run by well-performing managers
who invest in long-term projects is systematically undervalued, the fact
that such companies may become attractive takeover targets could
create incentives against value-enhancing, long-term investments.
4 5
C. Liability-Regime-Related Incentives
Corporate law imposes on managers the fiduciary duties of loyalty
46and care as well as other statutory obligations. If managers violate
their duties, shareholders can enforce their rights through a lawsuit,
resulting in potential monetary liability and other unpleasantries.
Managers thus have incentives to comply with their duties. Moreover,
to the extent that the scope of management's duties is uncertain or
such duties are imperfectly enforced, managers have incentives to
avoid taking actions that, while in fact not violating their duties, entail
the risk of a lawsuit.
47
D. Future-Emplayment-Related Incentives
Another reason why a manager may perform well is that she is
concerned about her future employment opportunities.4 s Even a well-
42 See, e.g., David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through the
Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66J. Bus. 405, 417-21 (1993) (examining the
relationship between performance and incidence of proxy contests).
43 See infra Part III.B.
44 See, e.g., Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN.
ECON. 431, 453 (1988) (finding a stronger association between prior performance and
probability of a resignation for companies with outsider-dominated boards than for
companies with insider-dominated boards). See generally Perry & Zenner, supra note 40,
at 134-35 (reviewing studies linking performance and tenure).
45 See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 187, 205-13 (1991)
(discussing the common focus on short-term incentives over long-term investments).
46 See supra note 27.
47 See Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REv. 887, 892-96 (1999) (discussing how legal indeterminacy causes cautious
business decisionmaking).
48 Cf Robert Parrino. CEO Turnover and Outside Succession: A Cross-Sectional
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performing manager may find that she is forced to leave her present
position and must look for another one. And even if not forced to
leave, a manager may want to depart voluntarily to get a better job.
To the extent that a manager's future employment opportunities are
related to how well she performs in her present job, concern over
such opportunities creates incentives for high-quality management.
9
E. Social-Status-Related Incentives
The way in which a manager runs her company may also affect her
power, prestige, and status. For example, a manager of a well-
performing company may earn various forms of public recognition-
such as being described as "it]he best CEO on Earth""' or as running
one of "America's Most Admired Companies"5'-and become more
powerful. Similarly, most managers would be embarrassed if their
companies became entangled in major scandals. As many managers
value power, prestige, and status, and want to avoid embarrassment,
social-status-related incentives may affect theirjob performance.
F. Internalized Incentives (a.k.a. Preferences)
Finally, internalized incentives affect how a manager runs her
company. A manager, for example, may work hard because she enjoys
it or would feel guilty if she did not. Another may, for similar reasons,
run the company in a socially responsible manner. Yet a third may
run the company to indulge in her preference for foreign travel and
luxury hotels.
Internalized incentives are ultimately a form of preferences.
Some managerial preferences may be consistent with, and conducive
to, running the company well. Many other managerial preferences,
however, detract from having the company run well. The other
incentives described above can then be used to align shareholder and
manager interests.
Analysis, 46J. FIN. ECON. 165, 184 (1997) (finding that poorly performing companies
are more likely to hire a CEO replacement from outside the firm).
+1 See, e.g., Anup AgraW & Ralph A. Walking, Executive Careers and Compensation
Surrounding Takeover Bids, 49 J. FIN. 985, 986 (1994) (finding that CEOs of target
companies who lose their jobs generally fail to find another executive position in a
public corporation within three years after the bid).
,, And), Serwer, There's Something About Cisco, FORTUNE, May 15, 2000, at 114
(asking the cover page question of whether Cisco's CEO is "[t]he best CEO on Earth").
A Geoffrey Colvin, America's Most Admired Companies, FORTUNE, Feb. 21, 2000, at
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As this brief sketch demonstrates, multiple types of incentives
influence managerial behavior. The various types of incentives have
different relations to corporate law. Liability-regime-related incentives
derive directly from rights created by corporate law. I will therefore
not further discuss their relation to norms, which exclude legal
commands, even though norms may reinforce liability-regime-related
incentives.
Similarly, compensation-related and job-preservation-related in-
centives derive from the power structure established by corporate law:
the power of directors to run the company, which includes the power
to select and compensate officers, and the power of shareholders to
elect directors. With respect to these incentives, therefore, corporate
law and something else interact. In the next Part, I will analyze
whether this "something else" is norms.
The remaining incentives lie largely outside the scope of cor-
porate law. Future-employment-related incentives would appear to be
driven primarily by third-party self-protective enforcement and thus
do not constitute norms. Social-status-related incentives, on the other
hand, are strongly related to third-party punitive enforcement;
likewise, internalized incentives may well include internalized norms.
The relation of norms to these incentive mechanisms is more fully
explored in Part IV.
III. NORMS AND CORPORATE POWERS
This Part addresses whether norms affect the two incentive
structures relating to the powers created by corporate law: executive
compensation-related to the board's power over corporate
property-and job preservation-related to the board's power over
corporate property and the shareholders' power to replace directors.
The principal focus of my analysis is on whether norms affect the
manner in which boards design the executive compensation system.
Executive compensation falls, to a large extent, in the power domain
of outside directors who, unlike the corporate officers who serve on
the board of their company, often have no substantial financial
interest in either the fortunes of the company or in retaining their
board seats. Moreover, in the area of executive compensation,
fiduciary duties impose few, if any, meaningful constraints on outside
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directors." Given the absence of strong financial incentives and of
liability concerns, norms may well influence how outside directors
design the executive compensation scheme.
I first describe several common practices in the compensation of
U.S. executives. Then, I consider whether "norms" account for the
prevalence of these practices. After discussing executive comp-
ensation, I briefly address the relation between norms and director
replacement.
A. Executive Compensation
In examining the compensation scheme for the top managers of
publicly traded U.S. corporations, it is easy to identify numerous
patterns: top executives earn a lot, with the CEO earning the most;
the overall compensation scheme has several components, including a
fixed salary, a bonus plan, and a stock option plan; compensation is
negotiated between the executive and a compensation committee;
"golden parachutes" protect top executives against hostile takeovers;
and so on.
It would not be an efficient use of space to provide an exhaustive
examination of each of these patterns. Thus, for purposes of this
Article, I limit my discussion to two patterns, chosen because of their
economic significance and because they are not, to the same extent,
present in public corporations in other industrialized countries: the
high overall compensation levels and the common use of stock
options to remunerate executives.
In this regard, outside director decisions regarding executive compensation
differ markedly from decisions to approve transactions in which one or more
managers have a financial interest-transactions that are intensely scrutinized under
fiduciary duty law, leaving less room for norms. See Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C.
Klein, Indixwd Stock Options: A Proposal for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3
STvN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 31, 38 (1997) ("[Eixecutive compensation is not a matter
conducive to judicial oversight."); Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A
Bard-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REv. 937, 959-62 (1993) (reviewing case law and
concluding that "courts have been highly reluctant to involve themselves in
compensation disputes"); Edward M. lacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive
Complnation, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 489, 495 (1998) ("[Clourts are loathe to intervene
n imatters of executive compensation.").
1- The latter fact may make it more likely that these patterns are linked to norms,
w'hich connote context and culture specificity, than to economic factors, which tend to
be more uni ersal. See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 177 (noting the special significance
of norms to close-knit groups). Several other patterns are probably attributable to
legal rules. Federal tax law, for example, creates incentives for companies to use
compensation committees, Perry & Zenner, supra note 40, at 129, and the vibrant
20011 1883
1884 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:1869
1. The Level of Executive Compensation
Top executives in U.S. public companies earn a lot. This is true in
absolute terms as well as in comparison to salaries of workers, of top
executives in other countries, and of top U.S. executives in the past.
Consider the following data. In 1997, the median total
compensation for a CEO exceeded $3 million. 4 Between 1992 and
1998, CEO compensation more than doubled while total employee
compensation increased by only 20%.'5 By 1998, CEOs of large
companies received compensation that was 419 times as high as the
compensation of their labor force." In the not-so-distant past of the
early 1980s, that ratio was only 42 to 1.5' Foreign executives do not
earn nearly as much as their U.S. colleagues. In the mid-1990s, CEO
compensation in the United States was about twice as high as the
compensation received by CEOs of similar German, British, or French
companies.58 These cross-country differences are particularly evident
when a foreign company acquires a U.S. company. When the German
company Daimler-Benz acquired Chrysler in 1997, for example, the
top five Chrysler managers together earned $50 million, while the top
ten Daimler-Benz executives made a measly $11 million."
That managers of large companies earn high wages is not
remarkable. Why U.S. managers should eam quite as much as they
do, so much more than they did in the past, and so much more than
their counterparts in other countries do, however, may be less
obvious.
Commentators have proposed various explanations for the level of
executive pay. For some, the high level of executive pay is purely the
result of market forces; companies competing for rare executive tal-
ent raise the compensation level for the chosen few.60 Consistent with
market for corporate control and the substantial discretion of directors to block
unsolicited takeovers may make golden parachutes a desirable component of a
compensation package.
4 The Boss's Pay, WALL ST.J., Apr. 9, 1998, at R13.
5 Perry & Zenner, supra note 40, at 123-24.
56 Tim Smart, Pay Gap Between Workers, Execs Wi7dens in '90s, ANN ARBOR TIMES, Aug.
30, 1999, at Al2.
57 John A. Byrne, The Flap overExecutive Pay, Bus. WK., May 6, 1991, at 90, 95.
58 Tara Parker-Pope, So FarAway, WALL ST.J., Apr. 11, 1996, at R12.
59 Greg Steinmetz & Gregory L. White, Sticker Shock- DaimlerChrysler is on Collision
Course overExecutive Pay, WALL ST. J. EUR., May 26, 1998, at 1.
60 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259,
1283 (1982) ("[Mlarket constraints... may be more effective in setting salaries than a
committee of uninformed independent directors."); Robert Thomas, Is Corporate
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that theory, new CEOs recruited from outside the firm, an instance
where market forces would presumably be strongest, are paid
significantly more than CEOs recruited internally. 61 While there is
1~2probably some truth to this theory, it fails to explain why comp
ensation levels differ across countries. Multinational companies,
presumably, compete for managers internationally. Why then should
U.S. companies pay higher compensation than otherwise similar
companies in other countries?
Alternatively, as Lucian Bebchuk and David Walker have recently
argued, the high level of executive pay may be due to the influence
that the CEO holds over the board of directors.5' Studies suggest that
CEOs have a significant impact on the selection of their fellow board
members,' and there is some evidence that powerful CEOs receive
more generous compensation than their less autocratic counterparts. 6'
This CEO domination theory may also be easier to reconcile with the
Executive Compensation Excessive, in THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 276, 278 (M.
Bruce Johnson ed., 1978) ("Competition among corporations... sets the level of
executive compensation."); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI
L. REx. 959, 975-78 (1980) (noting that "excessive" compensation is eliminated by
market forces, including competition for executive positions).
Q See John R. Deckop, Determinants of Chief Executive Compensation, 41 INDUS. &
Lus. REL. REv. 215, 225 (1988) (noting that the difference in compensation was about
$100,000).
"" See MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, Do CEOs SET THEIR OWkN
PAY? THE ONES WITHOUT PRINCIPAL Do 21-22 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7604, 2000) (concluding that in well-governed firms, pay contracts
give CEOs incentives to maximize shareholder wealth, while in poorly governed firms,
CEOs capture the pay process so that they set their own pay), available at
http://ww.nber.org/papers/w7604.
See Lucian An e Bebchuk & David Walker, Executive Compensation in America:
Optimal Contracting or Extracting Rents? (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); see also Elson, supra note 52, at 974-76 (discussing the phenomenon of
management capture of corporate boards).
Perry & Zenner, supra note 40, at 135-36.
SeeJohn E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation,
and Finn Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 372-73 (1999) (finding that CEO
compensation is higher when the CEO is also the chairman of the board, when the
board is larger, or when the outside directors are older or very busy). But see Catherine
M. Daily et al., Compensation Committee Composition as a Determinant of CEO Compensation,
41 ACAD. MNGMT. J. 209, 214 (1998) (failing to find evidence that the presence of
captured directors or other CEOs on compensation committees results in higher CEO
pay); Ronald C. Anderson &John M. Bizjak, An Empirical Examination of the Role of
the CEO and the Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay 16-18 (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file wih author) (finding no correlation between the
presence of a CEO on the compensation committee and executive pay, after
accounting for ownership structure), available at http://papers.ssr.com/
paper.tafeabstractjid=220851.
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fact that executive salary levels differ across countries; the influence of
the CEO over board members may differ systematically from one
country to another.6 On the other hand, the CEO domination theory
does not explain why U.S. salaries have risen so sharply over the last
ten years. During this period, by all accounts, investors have become
more powerful and managers have become correspondingly less
powerful, suggesting that the degree of overcompensation should
have declined .
Mark Loewenstein provides at least a partial answer to both the
presence of cross-country differences in pay and the recent surge in
U.S. compensation levels. He argues that both phenomena are due
jointly to the common use of stock-price-related compensation in the
United States and the substantial increase in stock prices of U.S.
companies. 9  Indeed, while average salaries and bonuses have
doubled from 1980 to 1994, the value of option grants has risen by
almost 700%.69 This, of course, just shifts the focus of the inquiry to
why stock options are more prevalent in the United States than in
other countries-a topic I take up in the next Part. But even after
taking account of the effect of stock options, a substantial gap remains
between U.S. and non-U.S. compensation levels. According to a
recent study, even ignoring stock options, executive salaries in the
United States are twenty percent above those in the United Kingdom
and more than twice those in France.7 0 Yet if overall compensation
were equivalent, one would expect the non-stock-option component
66 See Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 9 (suggesting that board members in other countries monitor
executives more closely than they do in the U.S.); Bebchuk & Walker, supra note 63.
67 See, e.g., Kevin F. Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive
Compensation, 32J. FIN. & QUANTITATVE ANALYSIS 331, 340 (1997) (finding that the
increased compensation of CEOs whose board contains a reciprocally interlocked CEO
of another company was higher in the 1970s than in the early 1990s); Loewenstein,
supra note 66, at 15 (noting the increased independence of board members); Perry &
Zenner, supra note 40, at 130 (concluding that "directors may have become more
vigilant monitors of CEOs"); Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the
Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1831 (1999)
(reporting that the influence of CEOs over board members has declined); Randall S.
Thomas & KennethJ. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation,
67 U. CIN. L. REv. 1021, 1035 (1999) (reporting increased activism by institutional
investors with respect to executive pay).
6, Loewenstein, supra note 66, at 4-5.
69 See Thomas & Martin, supra note 67, at 1029; see also Perry & Zenner, supra note
40, at 124 (reporting that, from 1992 to 1998, salaries increased by 29%, bonuses by
99%, and stock and stock option grants by 335%).
70 Loewenstein, supra note 66, at 3 n.6.
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in the compensation of foreign executives to exceed substantially the
non-stock-option component in the compensation of U.S. executives.
Cultural and regulatory factors have also been used to explain
cross-country differences. Reportedly, for example, "cultural" and
"social" reasons prevent Daimler-Benz executives from raising their
compensation to Chrysler levels.7' Also, high marginal tax rates in
Europe and Japan may impose a "tax obstacle" to high salaries. 72 It is
noteworthy, in this regard, that nontaxed perquisites is the only
category of pay in which European CEOs outpace their U.S.
counterparts" and that the surge in U.S. compensation levels
coincided with a substantial decline in marginal tax rates. 74
Finally, the availability in the United States of information on
executive compensation practices, which exposes the high compen-
sation of other CEOs, may have caused a ratcheting up effect in U.S.
compensation levels. 5  It is well established that compensation
committees and their expert consultants consider compensation levels
at peer companies in setting their own scheme.b On one hand,
compensation data from peer companies may provide only infor-
mation about the market rate for CEO services.77 On the other hand,
boards and executives may look to such data for other reasons, such as
"keeping up with the Joneses'"' or obtaining ammunition to justify
further pay increases. In either case, such a process arguably
produces strong pressure to raise salaries in companies whose
executives earn below average compensation levels without, one
71 Andre, supra note 16, at 161 n.460.
7, Cf Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 62 (1992) (arguing that tax cuts enacted
during Reagan's presidency removed the "tax obstacle" to granting large salary
increases).
Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Exutive Compensation and a Modest Proposal
f,,r (Farther) Reform, 50 SMU L. REv. 201,203 (1996).
" Barnis, supra note 72, at 62.
" lacobucci, supra note 52, at 510-11; Thomas & Martin, supra note 67, at 1041.
Sr, ,.g., Loewenstein, supra note 66, at 7 (noting that compensation committees
rely on salary surve)s in setting CEO compensation); Thomas & Martin, supra note 67,
at 1027; Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions-Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for
P, jinnanc, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 276 n.5 (1999) (discussing the role of
compensation consultants).
;, Spe lacobucci, supra note 52, at 511 (noting that the discovery of higher pay by a
comparable company may force a lower-paying company to raise salaries or risk losing
its executive); Loewenstein, supra note 66, at 7 (noting that relying on pay surveys
accommodates firms' important motivational, recruitment, and retention concerns).
7, Thomas & Martin, supra note 67, at 1041.
lacobucci, supra note 52, at 510.
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suspects, equivalent pressure to lower salaries of executives who earn
above average compensation, with the result that compensation levels
generally rise."
2. The Use of Stock Options
Stock options are an important component of executive
compensation in the United States."' In 1995, more than two-thirds of
public companies compensated their CEOs with stock options."
Among large companies, stock options are even more prevalent.
According to a 1996 study, 94% of the 250 largest companies use stock
options as part of their compensation package." Moreover, stock
options account for a substantial portion of executives' total
compensation. In 1998, options, on average, amounted to 35% of a
CEO's compensation in public companies and 38% of the
compensation of CEOs of S&P 500 companies.8
4
The common use of stock options is of relatively recent vintage.
In 1980, less than one-third of U.S. CEOs held stock options."5 Even
by 1985, only 8% of CEO compensation consisted of options."6
Commentators attribute the recent increase to several developments.
In 1993, the tax law was changed to disallow deductions for executive
compensation in excess of $1 million unless the compensation was
performance-related. 7 Moreover, investors pushed to make executive
compensation more sensitive to performance.88  Compared to other
incentive compensation schemes, stock options have the advantages
that their value correlates with what investors care most about, that
so KevinJ. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS
2485 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (noting that a salary in the fiftieth to
seventy-fifth percentile is regarded as competitive).
81 See generally Stabile, supra note 38, at 233-36 (discussing incentive
compensation).
Perry & Zenner, supra note 40, at 129-30.
83 Clawson & Klein, supra note 52, at 42.
84 Perry & Zenner, supra note 40, at 131.
85 Thomas & Martin, supra note 67, at 1029.
86 Barris, supra note 72, at 64.
87 Perry & Zenner, supra note 40, at 129.
8 See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 66, at 8 (arguing that increased use of options
is due to demands that CEO compensation be more closely linked to shareholder
returns); Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L.
REv. 713, 715 (1995) ("[M)ost shareholder criticisms of CEO pay have stressed the lack
of meaningful rewards for superior performance.... ."); Yablon, supra note 76, at 279-
80 (discussing attempts to structure executive compensation so as "to provide
incentives for shareholder wealth maximization").
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they are relatively objective and nonmanipulable,8 and that they are
easy to design and understand. 9°  Stock options also have the
perceived benefit of not resulting in an accounting expense if they are
not "in the money" when awarded." Moreover, proponents of the
CEO domination theory argue that stock options assist managers in
camouflaging the fact that they receive excessive compensaton.2
Options have indeed increased the performance sensitivity of
executive pay,'" although some commentators doubt that they have
resulted in improved performance."- Commentators have also argued
that so-called indexed or performance stock options-the exercise
price of which is adjusted for changes in a broad market index or a
more narrow industry index-would create superior incentives to
regular stock options. At least up to now, however, such options are
rare-possibly because, unlike regular options, they would result in an
accounting expense when exercised."
- Cf Paul NI. Healy, The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions, 7J. Acar. &
ECo N. 85 (1985) (presenting empirical evidence that managers manipulate accounting
figures to increase bonuses); Murphy, supra note 80 (noting the dangers of
manipulating standards used in bonus plans). But cf Stabile, supra note 38, at 256
(noting that managers can manipulate the value of stock options by reducing
dividends).- But see Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation:
Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options (Harvard Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 00-056, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(noting the substantial real cost of stock options, consisting of the difference between
the market value of options and the value placed by managers on the options),
http://x"%wv.hbs.edu/dor/papers2/9900/00-056.pdf..Q See Stabile, supra note 38, at 276-78 ("Stock options are the only type of
compensation that generate an expense that is deductible for tax purposes but that
does not have to be expensed for financial accounting purposes.").
Bebchuk & Walker, supra note 63.
See BrianJ. Hall &Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113
Q. J. ECON. 653, 685 (1998) (finding that median pay for performance elasticity has
more than tripled).
"I Stabile, supra note 38, at 239-41 (surveying studies and finding their results
inconclusive).W, See Clauson & Klein, supra note 52, at 33 ("[C]hanges in the value of
compensatory options should be rationally related to performance .... ."); Shane A.
Johnson & Xisong S. Tian, Indexed Executive Stock Options, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 35 (2000)
(positing that indexed stock options "result in more efficient incentive contracts");
Stabile, supra note 38, at 274 ("[E]quity theory tells us that for options to function as a
means of incentive, compensation received from them must be truly related to
performance.... ."); Bebchuk & Walker, supra note 63.
G Murphy, supra note 80, at 17 (finding that only one of over 1000 firms in the
sample used indexed options); Stabile, supra note 38, at 277-78. In the United
Kingdom, by contrast, the use of regular stock option plans has declined in favor of
stock-based performance plans based on relative stock price performance. Murphy,
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Finally, stock options are much less common at non-U.S.
companies.9 Until 1996, for example, no German company had
awarded stock options to its executives.98 Stock options are also an
immaterial component of managerial compensation in Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and Venezuela." And even in countries in which stock options are
used-such as Brazil, Canada, France, Hong Kong, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom-they account for a smaller percentage of
CEO compensation than they do in the United States. .... As
explanation, commentators have cited legal uncertainty,'O' unfavor-
able tax laws, °2 cultural factors, 0 3 labor opposition,W4 and the pres-
ence of alternative incentive devices.0°5  Even outside the United
States, however, the use of stock options is gradually increasing l"'
3. Norms and Executive Compensation
Whether any pattern of behavior is attributable to norms depends
on the factors that account for that behavior. To the extent that high
pay and options are market-driven devices to attract and provide
incentives to top executives, or are responses to tax laws or accounting
rules, economic and regulatory incentives,"7 rather than norms, would
supra note 80, at 9 n.15.
97 Loewenstein, supra note 66, at 5 ("[S]tock options have not been common
overseas."); Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment
System, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65, 71-72 (noting that compensation of
Japanese executives is not related to stock prices).
98 See Andre, supra note 16, at 161-62 (noting that Deutsche Bank and Daimler-
Benz were the first two German companies to create stock options).
99 Murphy, supra note 80.
100 1d
101 See Andre, supra note 16, at 162 (citing the "nearly unprecedented split"
regarding legal authorization); Murphy, supra note 80, at 8-9 (reporting that until
1997, executive stock options were illegal in Japan).
102 Loewenstein, supra note 66, at 5.
103 See Andre, supra note 16, at 162 (noting a common German perception of
options as an Anglo-Saxon invention); Porter, supra note 97, at 70-72 (comparing
cultural factors).
104 Andre, supra note 16, at 162.
105 Loewenstein, supra note 66, at 9; see also Perry & Zenner, supra note 40, at 136
(finding that U.S. firms use less equity-based compensation when other incentives
exist).
100 See Loewenstein, supra note 66, at 5 n.20; Murphy, supra note 80, at 9
("[I]nterest in stock options is exploding elsewhere in the Pacific Rim and in Europe
and Latin America.").
107 Even though financial accounting rules are initially promulgated by the
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explain these features. To the extent CEO domination of the board
accounts for high compensation levels and the use of regular stock
options, however, a further analysis is necessary to determine whether
norms contribute to the ability of a CEO to dominate the board.
The principal factor enabling CEOs to dominate boards is
undoubtedly the dispersion of shareholdings that gives rise to the
separation of ownership and control. The collective action problem
makes it difficult for dispersed shareholders to monitor management
and thus creates a power vacuum that a CEO may fill. Thus, the
potential for CEO domination results from the underlying economic
ownership structure of public companies.
Moreover, CEOs have stronger economic incentives to pursue
board domination than do many outside directors to resist
domination. CEOs prefer deferential boards to assure board approval
of CEO-favored policies in general and policies in which the CEO has
a personal stake, such as executive hiring and compensation, in
particular. CEOs can therefore be expected to invest time and effort
in dominating boards. CEOs are helped on this front by the fact that
they are more knowledgeable about corporate affairs than outside
board members and that they typically receive automatic support from
subordinate officers who occupy board seats. Outside directors, by
contrast, have low financial stakes in the company or in retaining their
board seats, are less knowledgeable about corporate affairs, and have
no natural body of fellow directors on whose support they can count.
Accordingly, they can be expected to invest little time and effort in
resisting CEO domination.
A related factor contributing to a CEO's ability to dominate
boards is the legal regulatory structure that grants incumbent board
members exclusive access to the proxy machinery for board elections
and highly preferred access to the corporate treasury to fund election
expenses. This structure contributes to the largely self-perpetuating
nature of corporate boards, in which incumbent board members
propose the slate of directors and shareholders usually elect the
incumbent board's nominees. Thus, once in control of the board, a
CEO can relatively easily retain control by assuring the selection of
allies to the board or even by having an occasional antagonist
removed from the board.
Financial Accounting Standards Board, a nongovernmental body, it is SEC rules that
require companies to abide by these standards. See, e.g., SEC Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R.
§ 211).2-42(c) (2000) (requiring the accountants' report to opine on the consistency of
financial statements with generally accepted accounting principles).
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While these economic and legal factors may well account for the
prevailing degree of CEO domination, Bebchuk and Walker also
suggest that norms of reciprocity, authority, and similarity '  constrain
outside board members from scrutinizing executive compensation
awards. But even though norms of that sort may well be held among
outside directors, their significance to executive compensation is
limited. For one, these norms do not ipso facto result in high
compensation awards. If, for example, outside board members were
selected by shareholder groups, earned moderate income, and looked
to a director with a large equity stake in the company for guidance,
norms of reciprocity, authority, and similarity could well result in
increased scrutiny of compensation awards. It is only if the CEO
selects board members, who tend to earn high income, that norms of
reciprocity, authority, and similarity reduce such scrutiny.
Second, an important fact in increasing compliance with such
norms is the ability to select persons as directors who subscribe to
these norms. Thus, if these directorial norms exist, it may not be so
much that outside directors abide by them because they are outside
directors, but rather that outside directors are selected as outside
directors because they abide by them.
In both of these respects, therefore, the relation between norms
and executive compensation depends on the process through which
outside directors are selected, and specifically on the relative influ-
ence of the CEO and shareholders in this process. And economic and
legal factors, rather than normative ones, largely determine this
relative influence.
A stronger argument for the influence of norms, also advanced by
Bebchuk and Walker, is that an "outrage constraint" limits the
compensation awarded to CEOs.l '0 What accounts for this outrage
constraint is that outside directors are reluctant to approve a
compensation plan that would embarrass them or compromise their
reputations."' Even with respect to this outrage constraint, however,
norms with respect to U.S. compensation awards seem, in
108 Bebchuk and Walker also argue that questioning CEO compensation runs
counter to the "support or fire" model of the board. It is, however, unclear whether
this model is a social norm or just a description of how rational outside directors act.
See Bebchuk & Walker, supra note 63 (suggesting that a reluctance to challenge the
CEO may reflect a logical conclusion that little can be gained from doing so).
10 Id.
110 Id. at 28-31.
III Id. at 29.
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international comparison, weak. Thus, it has been argued that social
and cultural norms constraining mega-compensation kick in much
earlier in Europe than in the United States. For instance, Daimler-
Benz claimed that social and cultural reasons precluded it from
raising the salaries of its top German executives to U.S. levels."'
To sum up, plausible arguments can be made that norms have
some impact on executive compensation. A CEO may use norms of
reciprocity, authority, and similarity, to which outside directors
subscribe, to obtain higher compensation, and a counterveiling
outrage constraint may limit how much compensation outside
directors are willing to grant to a CEO. Even in this area, however,
economic and legal factors predominate. To the extent that CEOs
indeed dominate boards, this is principally due to the economic
reality of share dispersion, the incentive disparity between CEOs and
outside board members, and the legal regulatory structure that
contributes to self-perpetuating boards.
B. Director Replacement
While norms have some role in executive compensation, their
relative significance for shareholder decisions to replace directors is
negligible. '" For one, the legal regulation of shareholders' powers is
much more detailed than the broad delegation of operational powers
to management. Legal rules, for example, circumscribe shareholders'
power to replace directors by regulating whether shareholders can
replace directors without cause, regulating whether shareholders can
convene a shareholders meeting or act outside of a meeting, and
limiting the length of a director's term. They give boards the power
to implement poison pills without the approval of shareholders and
I Andr6, supra note 16, at 161 n.460.
Whether norms affect the board's exercise of its power to fire executives is a
separate inquiry. I am, however, not aware of any major regularities in the exercise of
this power beyond the obvious one that successful CEOs are rarely fired. For a
summary of studies on CEO turnover and corporate performance, see Murphy, supra
note 80. In an), case, the factors affecting the exercise of that power are likely to
resemble those affecting executive compensation awards. See supra Part III.A.3
(enumerating factors such as the dispersion of shareholdings and the legal regulatory
structure that affect executive compensation awards).
114 Similarly, legal rules determine to what extent managers have the power to
institute governance changes without shareholder approval, to what extent
shareholders have the power to institute governance changes without the approval of
managers, and to what extent governance changes can be instituted only with the
approval of shareholders and managers.
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have sanctioned pills that, unless redeemed, pose economically
insurmountable barriers to a hostile acquisition."' At the same time,
legal rules deny boards the power to adopt "dead-hand" pills that can
only be redeemed by directors that were incumbents at the time of a
hostile bid," 6 and they impose a set of special fiduciary duties that
directors have to comply with when faced with a proxy contest or a
hostile tender offer.
11 7
Within these legal constraints, economic factors largely determine
actions by shareholders, challengers, and incumbents. Proxy contests,
for instance, rarely result in a change of control"" because waging a
proxy contest is costly;"9 because challengers are not reimbursed for
the contest's expenses unless they obtain control, whereas the
company bears the incumbent's expenses regardless of the
outcome;20 because the gains a challenger may obtain from increasing
firm value through traditional proxy contests are limited;'2 ' and
because shareholders are rationally suspicious of a challenger's
motives in waging the proxy contest.
15 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)
(giving the board great discretion in refusing to redeem the poison pill); Moran v.
Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding the general validity of the
poison pill).
16 Quicktur Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) (holding all
dead-hand pills invalid).
17 MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. 1985)
(holding that the duty of the board when selling the company is to obtain the best
price); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (subjecting
takeover defenses to heightened scrutiny); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Adas Corp., 564 A.2d
651, 658-63 (Del. Ch. 1988) (elaborating on the fiduciary duty of the board in a proxy
contest).
118 Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy
Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 407-411 (1983) (finding that in a sample of ninety-six
contests unrelated to takeover bids between 1962 and 1978, eighteen resulted in a
change of control).
9 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Frameworkfor Analyzing Legal Policy
Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1085-87 (1990) (discussing the iarious
types of costs involved in a proxy contest).
120 See Waterside Partners v. C. Brewer & Co., 739 A.2d 768 (Del. 1999) (holding
that the unitholder group that waged a successful proxy campaign against a merger is
not entitled to reimbursement of attorneys' fees); Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 119, at
1106-10 (discussing legal rules and practice on compensation of expenses).
121 In principle, challengers can benefit from the contest in two ways: by
increasing the value of their existing equity through, say, improved management or by
obtaining private benefits from controlling the company. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra
note 119, at 1091-93. Since challengers' existing equity stakes are often small, the
benefits they would derive from raising the value of the company is limited.
1 Challengers, at least implicitly, chose to seek control through a traditional
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Norms have arguably been more important in the past. Bob
Cooter and Mel Eisenberg have suggested that the failure of blue-chip
corporations, prior to the mid-1970s, to make hostile tender offers is
attributable to norms.'2' I have not investigated this assertion and
have some reservations about its historical accuracy. But whatever the
historical truth, the fact that norms may have been significant in the
past does not indicate that they are significant today. Indeed, Cooter
and Eisenberg do not claim that norms constrain or, for that matter,
induce hostile bids today. 2' At least in the present, therefore, there is
no substantial role for norms in the area of director replacement.
AT. NORMS AND EXTERNAL INCENTIVES
In this Part, I examine the relation of norms to two aspects of the
incentive structure external to corporate law: social-status-related
incentives and internalized incentives.
Rules that are sanctioned through a heightened or lessened social
status lie at the core of many norm definitions. Bad gossip, for
example, is a major norm enforcement device that Ellickson identifies
in a close-up study of dispute resolution in Shasta County./z And
McAdams's theory specifically ties norm compliance to social
esteem.-'6 Moreover, the content of rules enforced through the
proxy contest rather than through a hostile bid. A traditional proxy contest is
relatihely more attractive for challengers motivated by private control benefits, while a
hostile bid would be relatively more attractive for challengers motivated by increasing
company value. See Steven Lipin, More Potent Weapons Dwell in Takeover Arsena4 WALL
ST. J., Sept. 7, 1995, at C1 (noting shareholder reluctance to vote for a change in
control without an accompanying bid for the company's shares). Moreover, most
high-quality managers would rather make better use of their time-including running
their own companies and having them stage hostile bids-than institute a traditional
proxy contest. That a manager is participating in a proxy contest just sends a negative
signal about her quality.
)- Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1718.
'A In contrast, Henry Hansmann suggested to me that there is a present-day norm
of productivity that contributes to hostile takeovers. While I agree that productivity is
%alued in present-day society, I am less sure that it is valued as a norm-that is either
enforced by third parties bestowing social status on productive members of society or
that has become an internalized value-or an ideology-that is based on the belief that
one becomes richer by being more productive and on materialistic preferences where
financial wealth becomes relatively more important to increase one's utilities. Even to
the extent that productivity is a norm, I am uncertain how much it contributes to
hostile takeovers.
U. See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 214-15 (describing the practice of spreading
truthful negative gossip to pressure cattle trespassers into proper future conduct).
-",, See McAdams, supra note 2, at 355-75 (presenting an esteem theory of norms).
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bestowal or withholding of social esteem may well have become
internalized. If obtaining social esteem or corresponding internalized
preferences significantly affected the overall quality of managerial
performance, norms would be an important element in the incentive
scheme.
A. Social-Status-Related Incentives
A conclusive determination of how much the desire for social
esteem contributes to managerial quality must await a carefully
executed empirical study. My hunch, however, is that it is not much.
For one, relative to compensation and job preservation, the desire for
social status provides only a weak motivating force for managers. In
addition, social status depends on factors other than what the
manager does, such as the quality of the executive's communications
department, the executive's personality, appearance, and so on. Most
importantly, social esteem can accrue to managers for many different
types of actions, some of which may even be negatively correlated with
high-quality management. A manager, for example, may increase her
esteem by devoting her time to public causes,'27 running a "cool"
company, 12 getting an unusually high salary, introducing innovative
products," or selling expensive watches.13 ' That there are many ways
for managers to enhance their social status, however, does not make
social status a more important explanatory variable for managerial
behavior. Rather, it means that the motivating force of social status
gets diluted. Social-status-related incentives are therefore unlikely to
be a substantial factor affecting the overall quality of managerial
performance.
A somewhat stronger argument can be made that concern for
social status motivates outside directors who, as mentioned, have less
of a direct stake in the fortunes of the company. Mel Eisenberg has
127 See, e.g., Susan Adams, Corporate Communion, FORBES, Apr. 3, 2000, at 82
(describing the charitable activities of former GE executive Edward Morgan).
128 See, e.g.,Julie Creswell et al., Cool Companies 2000, FORTUNE,June 26, 2000, at 98
(featuring thirteen cool companies and their executives).
129 See, e.g., Kerry A. Dolan, The Age of the $100 Million CEO, FORBES, Apr. 3, 2000, at
122-24 (featuring a full size cover page photo of Robert Howe who, in 15 months,
earned more than $500 million in compensation).
130 See, e.g., Robyn Meredith, Digital Driv4 FORBES, May 29, 2000, at 128 (featuring
cutting-edge, e-car technology and highlighting GM CEO Rick Wagoner).
See, e.g., Joshua Levine, Time Is Money, FORBES, Sept. 18, 2000, at 178, 180
(featuring a cover page photo of watchmaker Christian Bedat).
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recently argued that outside directors, who once passively followed the
direction set by the CEO, now adhere to a new norm that requires
that they exercise greater care and actively monitor senior
executives.' While I agree with Eisenberg that monitoring by outside
directors has increased, active monitoring by outside directors has
not, so far, become regular practice. Moreover, monitoring by
outside directors is likely to have increased, to the extent it has, for
reasons unrelated to the desire for social esteem. These reasons
include the growing importance of institutional investors with
significant voting power and professional ties to outside directors and
legal rules providing incentives to companies to put more outside
directors on their boards. To be sure, the desire for social esteem,
including esteem from institutional investors, may also motivate
individual outside directors. Overall, however, my guess is that the
desire for social esteem from those who desire an active board and
from those who prefer a passive board largely cancel each other out,
contributing to an uneven practice of some active directors, some
passive directors, and many in-between ones.
B. Internalized Incentive5
A final argument I address here relates to the conjecture, recently
voiced by Lucian Bebchuk and David Walker, that it is unnecessary to
provide incentives for executives to expend effort since "U.S. CEOs
are more likely to be workaholics than shirkers."133 Assume that
Bebchuk and Walker are correct that U.S. executives are hard working
not only because they stand to derive strong financial gains from
business success, but rather because they enjoy, or at least do not
dislike, hard work., 4 This raises the question of why managers have
this preference.
For one, not every preference for hard work can be attributed to
'" Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 1278 (describing the change in corporate
governance models from a "managing board" to a "monitoring board"). This norm
would obviously not be consistent ith the CEO domination theory advanced by
Bebchuk and Walker in the context of CEO compensation. See supra text
accompanying notes 63-67.
) Bebchuk & Walker, supra note 63.
H4 Even if Bebchuk and Walker are correct, the other elements of the managerial
incentive structure would remain necessary to assure that managers work hard to
pursue shareholder interests rather than their own. See Murphy, supra note 89, at 721
(arguing that many managers value corporate sunrival over value maximization); Perry
& Zenner, supra note 40, at 142-44 (reviewing studies that suggest that managers make
acquisitions in order to raise their salaries).
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norms. Some executives, for example, may have a biological or
psychological predisposition towards working hard that is unrelated to
norms. Others, by contrast, may have internalized a neo-puritan work
ethic, in which hard work is a source of social and self-esteem. This
latter group can be said to have a normative internalized incentive for
hard work.
It is plausible that persons who subscribe to such a norm of hard
work are overrepresented in managerial ranks. In principle, two
different explanations could account for this. First, working as a
manager may instill a norm of hard work. 135 In other words, being a
manager causes one to subscribe to a norm of hard work. Hard work
would then be a true managerial norm. Second, the managerial
selection and self-selection process may lead persons who already
subscribe to that norm to become managers. A managerial career
would appeal more to persons who like hard work, and those who like
hard work are more likely to succeed in it-just as persons who are tall
are more likely to try becoming, and to succeed as, professional
basketball players. The chain of causation runs in the other direction:
being hard working causes one to become a manager. Though hard
workers are prevalent among managers, there is no special managerial
norm of hard work.
To be sure, even if the second explanation is correct, as I believe it
largely is, it is necessary for there to be a sufficient supply of hard
workers in the population at large. Norms, which affect that supply,
thus have some significance (comparable to the factors of genetics
and nutrition in affecting the supply of tall persons who may become
basketball players). The key factor, however, is the non-normative
managerial selection process that results in the hiring and promotion
of hard workers. Thus, even to the extent that an internalized norm
of hard work is an important aspect of the incentive scheme, non-
normative factors would largely account for the presence of hard
workers in managerial ranks.
CONCLUSION
Using norms to analyze the corporate structure requires first a
13 See, e.g., Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1727 (discussing corporate
'education," which occurs "when the firm voluntarily undertakes programs... that
communicate the firm's norms to its agents").
136 See id. at 1727-28 (noting that screening and monitoring are two methods in
which organizations can employ managers who adhere to norms).
THE LIMITED SIGNIFICANCE OF NORMS
more precise demarcation of how far the concept of norms extends.
Obviously, the further one stretches that concept, the more important
norms become. By the same token, however, the further one
stretches the concept of norms, the less useful it becomes as an
analytical tool. Definitions of norms that include rules that a third
party enforces to protect herself-rather than to punish those who
violate, or reward those who comply with, a rule-are better analyzed
using traditional economic models. Including such rules in the scope
of norms would stretch the concept of norms beyond its useful
boundaries.
More narrowly, and in my view more properly, defined, norms
play a limited role in the corporate governance of contemporary U.S.
public corporations. Specifically, norms may affect the executive
compensation structure by imposing an "outrage constraint" on
grossly excessive awards and by making it somewhat easier for CEOs to
dominate boards. An internalized norm of hard work may reduce
managerial proclivities to shirk. Even in these respects, however, non-
normative factors largely account for the fact that managers and
outside directors who subscribe to the relevant norms hold their
respective positions.
Arguably, norms were once more important in the United States,
and they may remain more important in other countries. Many
norms scholars suggest that norms tend to be most significant in
regulating relations in small, socially cohesive groups. To this one
may add that the potential for norms compliance is greatest when
more high-powered incentive devices are absent. Viewed in this light,
the modem public corporation in the United States does not lend
itself to norms governance. The relevant decisionmakers in these
corporations-managers, outside directors, and shareholders-are
not as such members of small and socially cohesive groups, and at
least managers and shareholders have substantial financial stakes in
how a corporation is run. Maybe, in the days of yore, these groups
were smaller and more cohesive, stock options were absent, and
hostile takeovers were rare. Maybe then, gentlemen dominated
corporate America and enforced on each other the rules of corporate
chivalry, and maybe such gentlemen are still powerful in other
countries. But whether we like it or not, small, socially cohesive
groups are gone from U.S. public corporations and high-powered
incentives are here to stay.
In the lead article for an earlier symposium on law and norms,
Robert Ellickson, one of the foremost norms scholars, predicted:
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"[T]he newly found appreciation of norms is likely to cause the
significant redirection of law and economics.' 3 7 My prediction for the
field of corporate law is that Ellickson's prediction will not hold true.
137 Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27J. LEGAL STUD.
537,538 (1998).
